

Saving Bulgaria's Jews: An analysis of social identity and the mobilisation of social solidarity

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Abstract

This paper investigates the arguments used in public documents to mobilize Bulgarians against the deportation of Jews in World War II. We focus on the key documents relating to the first wave of mobilisation in 1940-1 as provided by Todorov (2001). We demonstrate that these documents are based on three types of argument. The first, category inclusion, treats the Jews as part of a common ingroup rather than as constituting a separate outgroup. The second, category norms, proposes that help for those under attack is a core aspect of ingroup identity. The third, category interest, suggests that the ingroup will be harmed if Jews are persecuted. In each case, the predominant category on which arguments are based is national identity (i.e. 'we Bulgarians...'). This analysis is used to validate and extend a social identity of model of helping. The theoretical and practical implications of such an approach are considered in the discussion.

Introduction

Bystanders and the Holocaust

“The road to Auschwitz” wrote Ian Kershaw, “was built with hate but paved with indifference” (Kershaw, 1984, p.277). Although fanatics and ideologues may have formed the Nazi Party, framed its policies and committed its worst excesses, they were only able to do so with the compliance – or at least without the resistance – of the mass of ordinary Germans. As Abel (1938/1986) has shown, anti-semitism may not have been a central factor even for the mass of Nazi Party members, but they certainly had to condone the anti-semitism of the organization. Equally, even the regime’s own intelligence reports indicated that most Germans were disgusted by *Kristallnacht* – the great pogrom of 9th November 1938. But the population still accepted discriminatory race laws (Koonz, 2003). As Koonz puts it, again quoting from the SS Security Service reports: “persecution [of Jews] produces no enthusiasm among most people. But on the other hand... Although people despise its extreme forms, racial propaganda leaves its traces” (2003, p. 218). That is, few actively tried to make life miserable for Jewish people, but most avoided contact with them, accepted that their participation in society should be curtailed and hesitated to object at overt acts of repression.

Koonz (2003) stresses that ‘ordinary Germans’ had both knowledge and choice in these matters. Even if they didn’t know the exact details of the persecution, that was because they chose not to enquire too closely – and they certainly knew enough to be aware that their Jewish fellow-citizens were desperately in need of aid and support. Apart from those few individuals who were politically suspect, most of these Germans had considerable latitude in deciding where and when to comply with the regime. Browning (1993) even shows that those soldiers directly ordered to murder Jews had the option to refuse: it might have dented their career prospects, but it didn’t lead to persecution, let alone death.

The point can be made more widely. Throughout the Nazi empire, people retained some autonomy in how they responded to the holocaust. As Gross (2001) observes in

his account of the destruction of the Jewish community in Jedwabne, Poland by their non-Jewish neighbours: “a number of those actors could have made different choices, with the result that many more European Jews could have survived the war” (p. 12). The implication, as encapsulated in the title of Hilberg's seminal text (*Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders*; 1993), is that we cannot fully understand the holocaust by focusing on the Nazis and the Jews alone. We must always consider the moderating role of bystanders. How they chose to act made a critical difference.

The significance of these choices is underscored by considering those cases where people did help Jewish populations. In recent years, increasing attention has been devoted to such cases (e.g. Cesarini & Levine, 2002; Hilberg, 1993; Marrus, 1987). Consider the case of Poland, which is often thought of as most complicit with the holocaust. After the liquidation of the Warsaw Ghetto in Treblinka, a leading official of the World Jewish Congress reflected on how such a thing could have happened without any local opposition. He concluded that it was due Poles' blind hatred for Jews which made them co-responsible for the slaughter (Hilberg, 1993). Yet even here there were two organisations devoted to helping the Jews. One was a civilian Council for Aid to Jews (*Zegota*), the other was organised by the *Armia Krajowa* (an underground resistance movement attached to the Polish Government in Exile in London).

In Romania, Jews may have been expelled from the occupied territories (Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia which were lost to the Soviet Union in 1940 and recovered in 1941) but the German request to deport the Jews of 'Old' Romania was refused. In Denmark and Finland the Jews survived unscathed – the Danes arranged for the entire Jewish population to be transported to safety in Sweden. However, perhaps the most remarkable example of rescue occurred in Bulgaria where a series of petitions, individual letters of protest and public demonstrations against anti-semitic measures ultimately prevented the deportation of the indigenous Jewish population. Various commentators have pointed out that this was the only case where Jews largely survived within a country that was in the pro-German camp and where, at the end of the war, there were more Jews living than before it started (Arendt, 1990; Ben-Yakov, 1990; Cohen & Assa, 1977; Genov & Baeva, 2003). As one survivor wrote in a letter

to the historian of the holocaust, Martin Gilbert, this was ‘the miracle of the Jewish people’ (Gilbert, 1985).

Todorov (1999, 2001) has compiled a selection of the key contemporary texts relating to the Bulgarian rescue. Using these public documents, this paper will consider the bases on which authors sought to mobilise the population into a mass opposition. How did they argue against the oppression of Jews? What was the basis on which they appealed to their audience to oppose anti-semitic measures? First, though, let us consider existing understandings of the factors which determined how bystanders responded to the holocaust.

Approaches to the psychology of rescue

In recent years holocaust scholarship has turned such questions as who helped the Jews, why they helped the Jews and when they were effective. Much of this work is concerned with the structural and political conditions of rescue. Clearly, such factors as the nature of German control, the structure of government in different countries (and sometimes between different parts of the same country), the point in the war when deportations were proposed and the prospects of German defeat at that time, were all of critical importance in terms of affecting the choices that were available to people, the possibilities of saving Jews and the costs of so doing (Geras, 1995; Hilberg, 1993, Marrus, 1987).

However, there is also a sizeable psychological literature which is concerned with the factors which made individuals liable to intervene in the holocaust (Baron, 1985/6; Bauer, 1989; Marrus, 1989; Monroe, 1990, 1995, 1996, 2003; Oliner & Oliner, 1992; Tec, 1986). Not surprisingly, such a large literature contains a host of findings, many of which are contradictory. There is no clear consensus concerning the relationship of social class, gender, political affiliation or religion to rescue. However, there is agreement that, for religious rescuers, what counted was the particular moral content of their beliefs. This relates to the one finding on which nearly all the research concurs. It is that rescuers shared a worldview which Oliner and Oliner (1992) term ‘extensivity’. That is to say, they included victims as part of a common moral community with themselves and saw an obligation to help all members of that

community who were in need. Most commonly, they saw this moral community as including all human beings and saw it as self-evident that anyone in need deserved their help whether they were relatives, friends, Jews or indeed Nazis. However, this was not always the case. Sometimes the subgroup might be more restricted (say, to members of the same nation) and sometimes it might even extend beyond the human race to include all living creatures (Monroe, 2003).

In the main, such a moral outlook has been treated as a stable character trait. This is certainly true of the Oliners who were seeking to isolate 'the altruistic personality' (which is the title of their 1992 text). However, as Monroe (2003) argues, there are a number of difficulties with such an approach, not least that many seemingly reprobate characters showed conspicuous virtue during the holocaust (Oskar Schindler being a notable example) and many seemingly virtuous characters showed a singular disinclination to help. In response, Monroe (2003) argues that moral values affect action only to the extent that they are incorporated as part of identity. She further argues that identity is multi-faceted and that different aspects of identity may become salient in different circumstances. In this way, context can come to affect moral stance and the likelihood of rescue.

Monroe's argument explicitly draws on a number of social psychological sources, notably social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Moreover, her account of holocaust rescue echoes developments in the social psychology of helping. A number of models have begun to incorporate the idea that categorising victims as ingroup members is part of the intervention process. Thus, recent formulations of the 'arousal: cost-reward' model (Piliavin, Rodin & Piliavin, 1969; Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner & Clark, 1981) suggest that a sense of 'we-ness' leads to feelings of greater closeness and responsibility for the welfare of others which in turn increases both arousal and the costs of not helping (while decreasing the costs of helping) and these in combination make intervention more likely (Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder & Clark, 1991). Equally, a reformulation of Batson's empathy-altruism model (Batson, 1987, 1991) by Cialdini and his colleagues suggests that we will be more empathic and hence more helpful to others when we see them and ourselves as both included as part of an extended self-concept (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce and Neuberg, 1997).

Most directly, work in the social identity tradition proposes that group relations are critical to the way in which we respond to the plight of others. Indeed, it is built into the premises of this tradition that we will be more concerned with the fate of ingroup members and more likely to respond to the needs of those who share a common group membership with ourselves (Tajfel, 1978). Two strands of research in particular have developed this idea. Levine, Reicher and colleagues (Hopkins, Reicher, Harrison, Levine & Cassidy, 2004; Levine, 1999; Levine, Cassidy, Brazier & Reicher, 2002; Levine, Prosser, Evans & Reicher, 2005; Reicher, 1996a) address the helping literature. They argue that we are more likely to aid those who we categorise as ingroup members and therefore who we aid will vary as a function of how we identify ourselves. Thus, in one study (Levine et al., 2005) supporters of Manchester United football club witnessed a person falling over and hurting themselves. That person was wearing either a Manchester United shirt, a Liverpool shirt (a rival team) or a non-football t-shirt. When participants were led to categorise themselves as Manchester United fans they helped only when the 'victim' was wearing a Manchester United shirt. However, when they were led to define themselves in terms of the more extensive category 'football fan', they helped both when the 'victim' was wearing a Manchester *and* a Liverpool shirt.

The implication of the study is that more inclusive self-categorisations will increase the scope of helping behaviour. This accords with the philosopher Richard Rorty's discussion of 'solidarity' (Rorty, 1989) where he suggests that it is incumbent upon us always to try and extend our 'we-communities' so as to appreciate the pain of others and eschew cruelty towards them (note that solidarity can either be used to denote a 'fellow feeling' that may lead to actions that benefit others or to the actions themselves, we shall use it in the latter sense and hence it constitutes a broader behavioural category of which helping and rescue form more specific instances). The difference is that Rorty considers it impossible for this community to embrace all of humanity whereas, from a social identity perspective, there is no reason why one cannot define oneself as human (vs. non-human) or even more inclusively (say as a living creature vs. the non-living).

A second strand of research is concerned with volunteerism - that is to say, the conditions under which people will give time to organisations devoted to social care. A number of studies have shown that people are more likely to volunteer when they identify themselves as belonging to the same group as the recipients of care. Thus Simon, Sturmer and Steffens (2000) have shown that the more gay people identify themselves as such the more willing they are to engage in AIDS volunteerism (given that in Germany, where the study was carried out, the largest subgroup among people living with AIDS are gay people). Similarly, Sturmer and Kampmeier (2003) have shown that the more people identify with their local community, the more likely they are to volunteer for the local fire brigade. The importance of this work is that it shows that social identity processes do not simply relate to individual acts of face to face helping. They are also important to participation in collective movements which aim to alleviate the plight of others (see Simon, 2004).

However, it is important to recognise that the drawing of ingroup-outgroup divisions is only one part of the argument. For social identity theory, behaviour can never be derived simply from the fact of group membership. Rather one must take into account the content of the specific identity that is made salient. That is to say, our actions depend upon the beliefs and norms of the groups with which we identify (Jetten, Spears & Manstead, 1996; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a, b; Turner, 1999). So, while we may be generally inclined to help ingroup members, that does not mean we will always neglect outgroup members. Whether we do so or not depends upon what our group norms have to say about our obligations to others. For certain groups, there may be strong injunctions to 'look after our own' while, for others, the need to attend to those in need, irrespective of whether they are members of our group or not, may define who 'we' are (Hopkins et al., 2004; Levine, 1999). Indeed in certain cases, pro-social behaviour such as charity and helping may be the dimension along which we differentiate our group from others (cf. Jetten et al., 1996; Reicher, in press).

Analytically, then, we need to distinguish between helping based on ingroup inclusion and helping based on ingroup norms. In general, the focus of the former is on who the victim is ('I helped her because she was one of us') whereas the focus of the latter is on who the helper is ('I helped her because we are concerned with everybody's welfare'). To put it slightly differently, this argument suggests that there are two

dimensions of social identity which impact upon helping and social solidarity. The first relates to the category boundaries. The second concerns the meanings associated with group membership. If these dimensions are so important for helping - and if helping can be affected by working along these dimensions - then the question of how category boundaries and category meanings are defined becomes of crucial importance practically as well as theoretically.

Traditionally, the definition of social identity has been seen primarily in perceptual terms - as an intra-psychic and cognitive process. Thus categories are computed in such a way as to reflect the existing organisation of social reality (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994). This is also the perspective taken by those, such as Monroe (2003) who have used social identity concepts in order to explain the phenomenon of rescue. By contrast, those who have developed the social identity approach to helping behaviour have highlighted the rhetorical dimension of category definition (although it should be stressed that this is more a matter of emphasis than disagreement and that there is increasing recognition that both dimensions need to be addressed - cf. Haslam, 2001). That is, they argue that, precisely because of the importance of social identity for social action, those who seek to shape collective movements will do so by arguing over category definitions. Such people can be described as 'entrepreneurs of identity' who seek to make their projects a reflection of the social identities of their audience. To put it more conceptually, social identities are not simply perceptions about the world as it is now but arguments intended to mobilise people to create the world as it should be in the future (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a,b, 2001a, 2004; Reicher, Hopkins & Condor, 1997a,b).

In the case of helping, then, we might expect that those who wish to create social movements in favour of intervention might do so, firstly, by construing social categories in such a way that victims and potential helpers form a single ingroup and/or, secondly, by construing norms in such a way that humanitarian action is a central tenet of the group. The implication is that helping is neither a fixed function of personality nor automatically invoked by context. Rather it is something that can be actively created through argument. Helping is not something individuals come to alone through internal processes. It is something that can be publicly mobilised.

Such a perspective has the potential to make an important contribution to our understanding of large scale social phenomena such as rescue during the holocaust. Indeed it points to a limitation of the existing literature. This research tends to concentrate on individual acts such as harbouring Jews from the Nazis. Heroic and important as these acts were, it is arguable that social movements which involved large numbers of people in opposition to deportation (even if the commitment of each individual was much lower) were more significant in saving Jewish people from the 'final solution'. In Denmark and, over a more extended period, Bulgaria, such movements stopped deportation in its tracks rather than sheltered a limited number of Jews from the consequences.

It is therefore critical to understand how it is possible to mobilise significant portions of a population - including those who have not been socialised into what Monroe (2003) calls a 'virtue ethic' of seeing oneself as having an obligation to humanity as a whole – against genocide. To the extent that a rhetorical social identity perspective can help explain such mobilisations then it may not only contribute to an understanding of rescue during the holocaust but also of how to avoid atrocities in the future. The aim of this paper, as we have already indicated, is to contribute towards such an understanding by analysing the means by which Bulgarians were mobilised to oppose anti-semitic measures during the second world war.

To be absolutely explicit, our focus is on the appeals that were made to the population in public documents and not on the response of the population itself. The value of studying such documents (as opposed to private letters, diaries and so on) is precisely that they were intended for and available to the population at large, moreover they are still available for analysis today (see Cohen & Assa, 1997; Todorov, 1999, 2001). In these texts we have before us what Bulgarians had before them during the war. We can therefore use them to discover the grounds on which Bulgarians were asked to oppose the holocaust. Our specific concern is with the way in which the identity of this population was defined in the text, whether and how these identity definitions were used to argue against the oppression of Jews, and how widespread such argument were within these texts. More precisely, we will analyse the way in which (a) Jews were either included or excluded from the ingroup category, (b) opposition to anti-semitism was linked to ingroup norms.

Method

Historical context

In order to interpret the texts we are about to analyse, it is first necessary to understand something of the context in which they were written. But first, a proviso is necessary.

In his entry on Bulgaria in the Encyclopedia of the Holocaust (Gutman, 1990), Ben Yakov notes that accounts of Jewish survival are coloured by ideological bias, with differing sources wishing to allocate credit to different actors. Yet, despite these differences, which mean that sources must be handled with care, there is a considerable consensus as to what happened and who was involved in the rescue.

Accordingly, the following account is based on what is agreed between a number of texts (Arendt, 1970; Bar-Zohar, 1998; Ben-Yakov, 1990; Boyadjieff, 1989; Chary, 1970; Cohen & Assa, 1977; Genov & Baeva, 2003; Gilbert, 1985; Todorov, 2001). Only where there is disagreement between the texts, or claims are made in one that are uncorroborated by others, will specific citations be provided.

Bulgaria was part of the Ottoman empire until 1878 when, with Russian support, it won independence. In World War 1, Bulgaria was an ally of Germany and was punished at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 by losing approximately 10% of its territories and being burdened by heavy reparation payments. This led to a prolonged period of instability which was only resolved in 1936 when King Boris III took complete control of the country and exercised what was called ‘controlled democracy’. That is, the National Assembly (Subranie) continued to exist and even contained some opposition members, both social democratic and communist – although in 1942 the Bulgarian Communist Party embarked on a course of armed struggle against the government and, from 1943 the left social democrats joined the Communists in an anti-government ‘Fatherland Front’. However, from 1936 most members of the Subranie were supporters of the government which was appointed and controlled by the king.

One of the major priorities of the regime was to regain the confiscated territories and rid itself of the reparations. Accordingly, Bulgaria formed close ties with Germany

both politically and economically. Indeed by 1939, 68% of foreign trade was with Germany. However, at the outbreak of war Bulgaria declared neutrality and was courted by both Stalin and Hitler. In particular, pressure mounted from Germany to join the Three Partite Pact (Germany, Italy, Japan) signed in September 1940. This was seen as the best way to regain what Bulgarians saw as their 'rightful territories'. Accordingly the country became what Genov and Baeva (2003) call 'a passive and unwilling ally of Germany'. However one of the prices for Hitler's assistance was the introduction of anti-semitic legislation. Some 50,000 Jews lived in Bulgaria at the time, of whom some 25,000 lived in the capital, Sofia. They were primarily workers, petty tradesmen and pedlars. Few were bankers, businessmen or professionals.

In mid-October a 'Law for the Defence of the Nation' was introduced by the Minister of the Interior, Petur Gabrovski. It was based on the Nazi Nuremberg Race Laws, except that 'Jews' were defined by religion, not 'blood'. Restrictions were imposed upon residence, property ownership and the right to practise certain professions. The Jewish community campaigned vigorously against the bill and gained widespread support from organisations and individuals both outside and inside parliament – notably the Bulgarian Orthodox Church which represented some 87.5% of the population, including many converts from Judaism. This was reflected in a series of open letters, petitions, individual letters of protest and declarations of position (many of these were displayed in an exhibition in Sofia and are reproduced in Cohen & Assa, 1977). These in turn mobilised public sympathy and, as Ben-Yakov (1990) states, the majority of public opinion was against the bill. However, it was supported by the members of the pro-Government majority in parliament and accordingly passed into law on January 21st 1941.

Even before the law was passed, however, Bulgaria's relationship to Germany underwent a fundamental change. Following Italy's defeat by Greece in December 1940, Hitler felt it necessary to move his troops through Bulgaria to assist Mussolini. Boris III faced a choice between occupation or alliance and opted for the latter. On January 20th 1941 his Council of Ministers approved the German passage and on March 1st the Prime Minister formally signed a treaty of adherence to the Axis Powers. On the same day Southern Dobroudja was returned to Bulgaria and shortly

afterwards it gained Thrace, Macedonia and parts of Eastern Serbia, thus realising the longstanding nationalist dream of a 'Greater Bulgaria'.

Over the following two years the conditions of Jews gradually deteriorated. A critical point was reached with the arrival in Sofia of Adolf Eichmann's special envoy, the SS Officer Theodor Dannecker. On February 22nd 1943, he signed an agreement with Aleksander Belev, the Bulgarian Commissioner for Jewish Questions, to deport 20,000 Jews 'as a first step' (Ben-Yakov, 1990). Originally the text referred explicitly to Jews from Thrace and Macedonia, but these words were struck out. In fact, the deportation of Jews from these occupied territories went ahead between March 20th and 29th 1943. In total 11,343 people were taken to Auschwitz and Treblinka. Twelve survived.

Belev, however, was still short of his target figure and hence targeted the population of 'old Bulgaria'. He chose to start with the Jews of Kyustendil, a town near the old border with Serbia. The town sent a delegation to Sofia to oppose the deportation. It was joined by Dimitar Peshev, Vice-President of the Subranie and member for the town. He organised a letter of protest signed by 42 other parliamentary representatives of the majority party. Although government pressure forced 13 to withdraw their signatures and although Peshev himself was subjected to a vote of no confidence and forced out of his post as Vice-President, the deportation was suspended and Belev resigned.

Shortly afterwards, a new plan was devised which involved the expulsion of Jews from Sofia, pending their deportation from the country. The plan was published on May 22nd 1943 and on May 24th a demonstration of several thousand Jewish and non-Jewish Bulgarians marched to the royal palace in protest. The event has been described as second only to the Warsaw ghetto uprising as an act of resistance to the holocaust (Genov & Baeva, 2003) and it was at least partially successful. Although 19,153 Jews were driven from the capital, this was the climax of their persecution. Henceforth the king categorically refused any deportations from Bulgaria.

In August 1943, the king died shortly after visiting Hitler. This led to persistent rumours that he had been poisoned for defying the extermination policy. Since the

Crown Prince was a minor, three regents were appointed and a new government was formed. By October, Sofia's Jews were allowed to return. In August 1944 the 'Law for the Defence of the Nation' was rescinded. The next month, the regime collapsed and the Soviet army occupied the country.

Texts

As we have outlined, the persecution of Bulgarian Jews falls into three periods: the passage of the 'Law for the Defence of the Nation' (October 1940 – Jan 1941), the deportation of Jews to the extermination camps (March – April 1943) and the deportation of Jews from Sofia (May 1943). Our analysis will rely principally on the documents provided by Todorov relating to the first phase. This is partly for practical and partly for principled reasons.

First, for reasons of space it is not possible to analyse all of the documents, but at the same time, the first phase gives a sufficient number of public documents - as opposed to diaries, confidential reports and minutes of closed meetings – to provide an adequate corpus. The number is 7 as opposed to 4 and 2 for phases two and three respectively.

Second, the documents in the first phase are clearest with respect both to the intended audience and the intended outcome. Although they might have been addressed to specified figures the documents were public documents that were intended to reach and influence the population as a whole. Open letters were reported in the media, speeches to parliament were reproduced in the parliamentary record and reported on both newspapers and radio stations. The authors' aim was specifically to induce the widest possible opposition to the new law and thereby put pressure on parliament to reject it. Knowing who was being addressed and to what end, we can therefore analyse whether and how the documents constitute identities in order to try and achieve these ends. In the second and third phases this is less straightforward because there is more variety in the targets of the appeals and mobilization goals. Thus, some texts (e.g. Peshev's letter signed by majority party parliamentarians) are aimed specifically within the party to demonstrate that deportations would harm its ability to govern. Other texts (notably those by Communists supporting the 'Fatherland Front') are aimed to mobilise people to join the fight against the regime as a whole.

The texts chosen by Todorov (1999/2001) to represent the large number of documents protesting against the ‘Law for the Defence of the Nation’ are as follows:

Document 1: Statement by the Bulgarian Writers Union to the Prime Minister and the Chairman of the National Assembly: 22nd October 1940

Document 2: Statement by the Governing Board of the Bulgarian Lawyers Union to the Chairman of the National Assembly: 30th October 1940

Document 3: Open letter from Christo Pudev to the National Assembly Deputies (also signed by a range of writers, professionals and politicians including three former ministers): not dated

Document 4: Statement by the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to the Prime Minister: 15th November 1940

Document 5: Open letter from Dimo Kazasov (a journalist and politician affiliated to the non-Communist opposition) to the Prime Minister: not dated

Document 6: Speech by Petko Stainov (an academic theoretician of jurisprudence and leader of the non-Communist opposition) in the National Assembly: 19th November 1940

Document 7: Speech by Todor Polyakov (Communist opposition member) in the National Assembly: 20th December 1940.

There are two reasons to accept Todorov’s selection of these documents. The first is that they cover the various categories of public opposition to the ‘Law for the Defence of the Nation’, including professional organisations (documents 1 and 2), prominent ‘opinion leaders’ (documents 3 and 5), the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (document 4), and the twin strands of parliamentary opposition, social democratic and communist (documents 6 and 7). The second reason is that all the documents are singled out in other sources as being of significance. Thus Ben-Yakov’s entry in the Encyclopedia of the Holocaust explicitly mentions documents 1, 2 and 4, and indirectly refers to 3, 5, 6 and 7. Likewise, Genov and Baeva (2003) explicitly mention documents 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7 while indirectly referring to 3 and 5. Cohen and Assa (1977) refer to documents 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7 and quote extensively from Kazasov’s letter (Document 5). The letter is also cited in Kasazov’s entry as one of ‘The Righteous Among the Nations’ at Jerusalem’s Yad Vashem Holocaust Monument

(<http://www1.yadvashem.org/righteous/bycountry/bulgaria.html>).

The originals of these documents can be found in the Bulgarian Historical state archives. The texts of these documents (which will be coded as D1 – D7 in the analysis) can be found in English in Todorov (2001) pp. 45-69. They can be found in French in Todorov (1999) pp. 59-87. There are obvious problems in analysing texts in translation (see Eco, 2004; Fairclough, 1992), especially when undertaking close analyses of the deployment of social categories. These problems are exacerbated by the fact that the French translation was undertaken by Todorov himself whereas the English version was translated from the French by Arthur Denner. Thus the English text which we present in the paper involves a double process of translation, and this must be kept in mind when evaluating the analysis. However, as a minimum safeguard, once the analysis was completed using the English text, it was checked against the French text by the first author in order to see if this would lead to any changes. It did not.

Analytic method

Our analysis of the documents is based upon SAGA (Structural Analysis of Group Arguments) as outlined by Reicher and Sani (1998) and illustrated by Sani and Reicher (2000). SAGA is not a method in the sense of an invariant set of procedures. It is better understood as a general means of investigating the issues that arise from a stance which sees categories as constructed, debated and contested but which also sees there to be systematic consequences which arise from category constructions. On the one hand, then, it is necessary to look in detail at the process of contestation and the specific category definitions which arise within it. This is a qualitative exercise involving ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973) of texts. On the other hand, it is necessary to show how constructions, or relations between constructions, are predictably associated with given outcomes. This is a task of synthesis which is amenable to summary description and quantitative analysis. The particular forms taken by these different phases of the analysis depend upon the precise issue that is under investigation.

In the present case, we wish to investigate whether our texts contain definitions of either category boundaries or category content which imply either that the Bulgarian Jews are part of a common ingroup with the general audience (category inclusion

arguments) and/or that the audience belongs to a category for whom helping people irrespective of who they are and to what group they belong (category norm arguments).

This requires us, in the first stage of analysis, to provide a detailed qualitative account of all of the arguments used in the documents, paying particular (but not exclusive) attention (a) to the way in which the audience and the Jews are categorised, and more particularly to cases where the audience and the Jewish population are included in a common category; (b) to the ways in which any norms are associated with the audience category, and more particularly where norms are characterised in such a way as to require intervention (for details of how arguments are identified, see Reicher & Sani, 1998). As we will show, a third broad form of category argument emerged from this stage of the analysis, namely (c) considerations of the way in which deportations would impact on audience category interests.

In a second stage of the analysis, we provide a systematic inventory of which arguments are used in which documents, with a focus on how many of the documents employ each of argument types (a) category inclusion, (b) category norms and (c) category interests and also how many employ at least one of these three types.

All four authors undertook both stages of the analyses, reading all the texts, classifying the arguments and assigning argument types to individual texts. Any differences of coding were resolved through discussion. Where it was agreed that there are ambiguities in the material, these are indicated in the text.

Analysis

Our analysis is divided into two parts corresponding to the two stages of analysis. In the first part we present the full range of category argument that were used: that is, (a) arguments relating to category inclusion; (b) arguments relating to category norms; (c) arguments relating to category interests. In the second part of the analysis we will summarize the frequency with which these argument types were used within the texts.

Part 1. Presentation of Arguments

A. Category inclusion

Extract 1 (D1): *"the bill's objective is to deprive a Bulgarian national minority of its civil rights.... Our legislature must not approve a law that will enslave one part of Bulgaria's citizens, and leave a black page in our modern history."*

Extract 2 (D3): *"Have you not walked by the children of Yuchbunar [a working class quarter of Sofia with a large Jewish population] on the streets of the capital? Little children and students, have you not seen them, famished, jaundiced, wasted and ragged, marching alongside Bulgarian children on Cyril and Methodius' Day? Have you not heard them, their voices hoarse, singing O Dobroudja [a patriotic song calling for the return of the town of Dobroudja which was ceded to Romania under the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest] and all the other songs of our nation's spirit at the top of their weak little lungs"*

Extract 3 (D7): *"I will refute the claim that the Jewish minority threatens the nation, and, consequently, that measures must be taken to defend it... Bulgaria's Jews... speak and think in Bulgarian, have fashioned their style of thinking and their feelings after Botev, Vazov, Pencho, Slaveikov, Yavorov [Bulgarian cultural icons] etc. They sing Bulgarian songs and tell Bulgarian stories. Their private selves are modelled on ours - in the street, on our playing fields, at school, in the barracks, in workshops and factories, in the mountains and the fields, our sufferings are their sufferings, our joys their joys too"*

Extract 4 (D6): *"And so, gentlemen, we come to the bill's second clause, which sanctions a number of important restriction to which Bulgarian citizens of Jewish origin are to be subject... In singling out a group of people in order to assign them a particular status, and in restricting their basic rights, this bill, in Article 15, Paragraph A, relies, as I said, on a sui generis racism, one based on birth and blood. I do not subscribe to racial theories. Racial purity is a fairy tale. I do not believe in fairy tales and I am not about to draw conclusions of inequality amongst our citizens on the basis of an ill-founded theory of racism and racial purity, no matter how it is presented here. The term 'pure race' is a*

fiction. Who among us, knowing the history of this land, can say 'I am racially pure?'"

These four extracts are presented at start of our analysis not because they are the only passages relating to category inclusion, but because, alone and in combination, they allow us to make a number of important points. First, and most fundamentally, all of the extracts presuppose a national framework and include the Jews as part of the national ingroup. While our focus is more on *what* category constructions are used rather than the detailed discursive means by which they are accomplished (see Edwards, 1996, Potter, 1996), it is worth noting that this framework is sometimes made explicit through the use of terms such as 'nation', 'country' or 'Bulgaria' but frequently invoked implicitly. Take the term 'Our legislature' from extract 1. Insofar as this is discussing the legislature that is considering the 'Law for the Protection of the Nation' it refers to the Subranie or National Assembly. Hence the term 'our' invokes a national positioning. Another example of this is found in extract 3. After stressing how Jewish culture and thought is Bulgarian, the text continues "*Their private selves are modelled on ours ... our sufferings are their sufferings, our joys their joys too*". This only makes sense if 'ours' and 'our' refers to Bulgaria and hence the audience are presupposed to have a national identity. As Billig (1995) argues such deixis of small words is central to the way in which nationhood becomes 'banal': an unnoticed, everyday, but for that, all the more crucial frame for viewing the world and ourselves in the world. In other words, as we have already suggested, the most powerful way of imposing category definitions may be not to argue for them but to take them for granted.

As with the imposition of the national category, so the place of Jews within this category is sometimes taken for granted. This is true of extract 1 from document 1 in which the term 'Jew' never appears. Rather, the target of the legislation is always referred to in national terms: as 'a Bulgarian national minority' or else as 'one part of Bulgaria's citizens'. However, where categories are already a matter of public debate it may be less effective to treat them as givens and a failure to argue may render one more likely to succumb to the arguments of others. Although the use of a national framework to debate a piece of national legislation may have been uncontroversial, the inclusion of Jews within that framework certainly was. After all, the whole point

of the legislation was to place restrictions upon a supposed danger to the nation. In its introduction, the law stated *“the Jews are an evil and a foreign element among the Bulgarian people that acts against the State”* (cited in Ben-Yakov, 1990, p. 266).

The texts we are considering are counter-arguments to this claim. One aspect of that counter argument is the assertion that Jews couldn't be a threat even if they were alien. Hence they are generally described as a minority and they are frequently portrayed as weak (*“famished, jaundiced, wasted and ragged”* in the terms of extract 2). In several cases the argument is stated quite explicitly. Indeed the passage that precedes this poignant description challenges the accusation that Jews are speculators who damage the economy. The authors retort:

Extract 5 (D3): *“the vast majority of Jews in Bulgaria are working class people: small grain merchants, pushcart vendors, retail tradesmen, labourers and maids, all of them working for a living and all of them going hungry”*.

Another aspect of the counter argument is an explicit claim that, far from being alien, the Jews are thoroughly Bulgarian. This is true of extracts 2 and 3. These extracts stress the commonality between Jews and other Bulgarians. They invoke many of the conventional criteria of nationhood (common territory, language, culture, loyalty - cf Anderson, 1983; Connor, 1994) to underscore the Bulgarian identity of the Jewish population. Moreover, especially in extract 3, it is stressed that adherence to these criteria is not merely a matter of public conformity that could mask an underlying difference: the psychic worlds of Jews - their thoughts, their feelings, their private selves - are thoroughly Bulgarian.

Extract 4 is even more explicit in its counter-argumentation. That is, it does not only use an inclusive formulation at the outset ('Bulgarian citizens of Jewish origin') but then goes on to contest the validity of exclusive (i.e. racial) formulations. These are dismissed as fairy tales and as fictions, especially in Bulgaria where *“knowing the history of this land, no-one can say 'I am racially pure'”*. One implication of this is that all Bulgarians are equally mixed and equal in being mixed. A second implication is that, while the speaker knows about the national past, anyone who asserts exclusive

racial doctrines must be ignorant of Bulgaria - not fully Bulgarian themselves. This is to invoke a further facet of the argument which arises in a number of documents.

As we have argued elsewhere (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a), if category definitions are contested, then it becomes necessary to establish why one's own version, as opposed to others', should hold sway. There are various ways in which this is done. One, as in extract 2, is to invoke references to shared cultural symbols of the category such as national songs. Another, as in extract 3, is to invoke cultural icons such as national heroes and national poets. Such usage is given further authority by the use of poetic language in the extract itself. What is more this language uses vivid illustrations that, in the terms of social representations theory (e.g. Farr & Moscovici, 1984), render the construction more familiar and accessible by making it concrete.

Another way of establishing one's category definitions is by establishing ones own credentials as a person who has the right to speak for the category (or else disqualifying one's rivals by challenging their category credentials). The simplest and most powerful way of doing this is by establishing oneself or ones organisation as a typical part of the ingroup (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, 2004), and it is something that appears in all of the documents. It is what the writer is doing in extract 4 when he writes about "*knowing the history of this land*". It is also to be found in the first words of extract 1 which read: "*Dear Prime Minister, we, the undersigned Bulgarian writers...*". This is, of course, an accurate description of the authors, but as discursive psychologists point out (Edwards & Potter, 1992, Potter, 1996), no description is neutral. The authors could equally accurately have been described as 'writers' or as 'intellectuals'. The term 'Bulgarian' serves to establish their ingroup prototypicality. The point is even clearer in extract 5 below:

Extract 6 (D3): "*I am just an ordinary Bulgarian citizen, and so if I speak to you today, it is because I know in my heart that you too - sons and grandsons of those who died for freedom on the gallows, on the hillsides and in the ravines of the Balkans, or on the executioner's block at Batak [site of Turkish repression of the Bulgarian insurrection of 1876] - have not forgotten the oath they swore with their last breaths: Let us protect humanity and freedom!*"

Here the author is entirely explicit in defining himself as an 'ordinary' Bulgarian citizen. Were he to be categorised as exceptional (say, in terms of his position as an MP or his profession as a journalist), he would be open to the charge that his views are also exceptional and differ from those of the population in general. By being 'ordinary' the author makes himself similar to his fellow Bulgarians and knowledgeable about what it means to be Bulgarian.

As for the identity of the audience, the issue is more nuanced. At one level the author presents them as unambiguously Bulgarian - indeed as descendants of national martyrs. However, if they are Bulgarian and live up to their ancestors, they will share the views of the author and protect the Jewish population. If they fail to do so, they will be denying their heritage. They will be worse than foreigners, they will be renegades. In sum, then, these texts do not simply create a common ingroup including victims and helpers, but a tripartite relationship of inclusion between the author, the Jews and the audience. It is this which allows the author to speak for the audience in including Jews amongst them.

But is inclusion always achieved through the use of national categories? Document 2, from the Union of Bulgarian lawyers, does indeed employ national inclusion, but it also contains a passage in which professional inclusion is stressed. It refers to "our colleagues of Jewish extraction" and states that:

Extract 7 (D2): "As a group, they have always been upstanding members of our order and have always assumed their professional and moral duties as lawyers. Some, both in the past and still today, have served as members of the governing bodies of our organizations and institutions and have carried out the responsibilities entrusted to them with diligence and dignity"

This could be read as a form of inclusion which invokes the aid of non-Jewish lawyers for their Jewish colleagues. However, given that the document is not addressed to lawyers but rather is addressed from lawyers to the National Assembly, it might better be read as a concrete example of how Jews are part of Bulgarian national life and national institutions and that, far from a law being necessary to defend the nation against Jews, the Jews actively contribute to the national good. In the context

of the document as a whole, then, this apparent counter instance forms part of the pattern of national inclusion.

Finally, consider document 4 which is addressed to the Prime Minister from the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church:

Extract 8 (D4): *"the bill makes no distinction between Israelite Jews and those Jews who, though of unbaptized parents, have personally adopted the Christian faith. It treats these Christians and the Israelite Jews in the same way. The Christians of Jewish origin, who have personally adopted the Christian religion five, ten, twenty years ago or more, are, by their faith, by their religious and folk customs, by their language and by their culture, naturally linked with the Bulgarian people; they have severed their ties with the Jewish community and have assimilated into the Bulgarian people, yet this bill forcibly separates them from our people by placing them in the same category as the Israelite Jews."*

This extract differs from all those we have seen thus far by denying that all Jews are Bulgarians. Only Christians are Bulgarians and hence only Jews who have converted to Christianity acquire the language, the culture and the faith to be included in the Bulgarian nation. Note that the criteria of nationhood are the same as in extracts 2 and 3. Note also that the appeal for solidarity is ultimately grounded in the Bulgarian identity of converted Jews (i.e. save them not because they are Christian but because, being Christian, they are Bulgarian). Hence, even if Christianity is the ostensible inclusive category, in actual fact the argument is identical to those we have previously encountered in the sense that Jews deserve solidarity as fellow Bulgarians. It differs in the sense that only some Jews (converts) are Bulgarian and therefore only some deserve help on this basis - as document 4 goes on to state: *"(t)hat is why our national Church is compelled to speak out in defence of its children who are bound both to it and, by their faith, to the Bulgarian people"*. In answer to the question we posed above, then, even where alternative categories are invoked (professional, religious), category inclusion tends to be underpinned by the national category.

All this may seem to obscure a glaring omission. What of universalistic descriptions of the victims: not as Jews or even as Bulgarians but as fellow human beings. The

reason for this omission is simply because such instances are all but absent in the data. There is only one clear example in the documents we are considering. It comes from document 7: *“As Gorky says: ‘Man: how proud that sounds’. We no longer consider it acceptable to inflict cruelty on animals, yet now we are about to reduce thousands of innocent and law abiding people to the status of half-men...”*. Yet this is not to say that universalism is lacking in the documents. Rather, it takes a somewhat different form as we shall show in the next section.

B. Category norms

Whereas category inclusion is almost exclusively based on national categories, this is not true of the use of category norms. In document 3, for instance, Christo Punev addresses members of the National Assembly in the following terms: *“As deputies, you have a legal and moral duty: to defend the Constitution. This duty is unquestionable, as you know perfectly well, better than I”*. He concludes (just after the passage reproduced in extract 5 that finishes with the words: *“Let us protect humanity and freedom!”*):

Extract 9 (D3): *“All Bulgarian citizens capable of bearing arms swore and still swear to defend Bulgaria. And you, gentlemen, as deputies, you have sworn to do something else as well - to defend the Constitution!”*

In document 5, Dimo Kazosov addresses the Prime Minister and notes his various group memberships: as head of the national educational system, as President of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, as Professor at Bulgaria's only university, as president of the Bulgarian Pen Club. He then continues:

Extract 10 (D5): *“Everyone also has the right to expect you to show a heightened sensitivity to any attempt to condemn defenceless citizens to a moral death, incite the young generation to shameful violence, falsify historical facts, blacken the reputation of writers, political figures, scholars, and soldiers, and question the loyalty of any and all who are proud enough not to think like your friends”*

In other words, the Prime Minister's various group memberships are invoked in order to represent anti-semitic measures as anti-normative to each of them. An educationalist should not corrupt the young, a scientist should not distort facts, a President of the Pen Club should not disparage his members - and so on. In this way, the use of norms allows for a direct appeal to members of small but influential groups to protect those less powerful than themselves. However, these extracts can also be read on another level. That is, they are intended to put indirect pressure on political leaders by mobilising the broader (national) population against them for supporting the proposed law. Any leaders who attack "*defenceless citizens*" reveal themselves to be unworthy of their position.

Thus the use of normative arguments relating to non-national categories is not in opposition to the use of national categories. Indeed, the two were often complementary and, although not exclusive, norm arguments based on nationhood were found in every document. Such arguments occurred at a number of levels. To start with, the very use of nationhood is inherently normative (see Billig, 1995, Taylor, 1989). That is to say, there are certain assumptions as to how a nation should be. Notably, it is a sovereign and horizontal community (Anderson, 1983): one which is in charge of its own affairs and within which all are equal as nationals. Unless these assumptions are explicitly contested they will be presupposed and do not need continuous restatement. Correspondingly, it can be presupposed that violation of these assumptions – either to divide the people or else to impose a foreign will upon it - will be seen as an assault on the nation. It is on this basis that one can read the following statements as accusations that the proposed legislation attacks the norms of nationhood. First, Christo Purnev sarcastically suggests to members of the National Assembly that:

Extract 11 (D3): "*if you think our country should be destabilized during the critical days ahead, when what we need more than ever before is peace and harmony among all citizens living under our Bulgarian sky, then you will vote with the instigators and authors of this bill*".

Second, in the National Assembly, Todor Polyakov asks:

Extract 12 (D7): *“why is this law being proposed? That question troubles many of us, and so we have to ask ourselves whether it just might be that it is being imposed on us by foreigners and by foreign interests”*.

As well as invoking norms based upon nationhood in general, another form of argument is to invoke specific norms relating to the Bulgarian nation in particular. We have already seen an instance of such a norm argument in extract 5, in which it was stated that the invocation of martyrs to the nation was: *“Let us protect humanity and freedom!”*. There are many similar examples where it is asserted that Bulgarian culture is associated with a series of norms and values that impel them to help the oppressed, the weak and the vulnerable. They have *“traditions of religious tolerance and humanity, won at so great a cost”* (Document 1). Their cultural originality lies in their *“humanity, justice and compassion for all those who suffer”* (Document 5). They are a people who are *“tolerant and honourable”* (Document 6) or else *“tolerant, hospitable, good”* (Document 7).

As in the case of category inclusion, these attributes are sometimes just stated and sometimes spelt out and justified. Justification can be done formally, in relationship to core national texts, notably the constitution. As Stainov states in his speech to the National Assembly (Document 6): *“the proposed legislation violates our Constitution, particularly Article 57, which states that all Bulgarian citizens are equal before the law. Equality before the law is one of the fundamental preconditions of Bulgarian constitutional and public law”*. Not surprisingly, the Union of Bulgarian Lawyers make similar points in their statement (Document 2) and they also cite article 57.

More usually, however, history is invoked. This is already hinted at in the reference in Document 1 to *“traditions of religious tolerance and humanity, won at so great a cost”*. This invokes the long period of foreign domination and the birth of modern Bulgaria in a war of independence against the Turks - a war in which most national heroes such as Vasil Levski and Christo Botev gained their reputations. In extract 8 this link between history and identity is elaborated:

Extract 13 (D3): *“Now and then you [National Assembly members] will have heard what Bulgarians are saying; in the cities and in the countryside they are*

all saying the same thing: 'If only Levski and Botev [heroes of the war of liberation against the Turks] were here today, they would make a whip out of the rope that hanged the Apostle; they would chase us down and flog us to make us understand their ideas and just what is this liberty in the name of which they died for Bulgaria"

At one level, these are strongly universalistic arguments. Because of their own sufferings and their own lust for freedom, Bulgarians respond to suffering irrespective of who experiences it and they support everybody's right to freedom. However, at another level, they are strongly particularistic. Solidarity is a distinctive characteristic of the national ingroup. This is eloquently expressed by Dimo Kazasov:

Extract 14 (D5): *"When the Bulgarian people lose their sense of justice that they have nurtured over the course of centuries and that is so much a part of their national identity, they will lose their moral and spiritual uniqueness, their Slavic essence, their Bulgarian face"*

Likewise, the Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church may only use category inclusion arguments to defend converted Jews, but it uses general moral precepts to oppose persecution of all Jews. In Document 4 it is asserted that: *"even in those of its clauses that target only Israelite Jews, the proposed law contains measures that cannot be considered just or useful for the defence of the nation"* (Document 4). Yet, at the end of the document it is made clear that these moral precepts are something that attach specifically to the Bulgarian nation. Thus a change in the law is advocated as a means of *"safeguarding our reputation as a freedom-loving, just and tolerant people"*. However, there are important differences between this use of nationhood and that in extract 9. Whereas the latter characterises 'justice' as something which distinguishes Slavs and Bulgarians from other national groups, here no such distinction is made.

There are a number of similar instances. For instance, in document 3, Christo Punev writes: *"Before raising your hands to ratify a shameful and inhuman law, a law that goes against all civilized norms, you should have a look at the history of our people,*

their struggle for freedom”. In document 1, the Writers Union refers to past sufferings of the Bulgarian people and then asks:

Extract 15 (D1): “*Should we then imitate these atrocities and follow a similar and dangerous road that will lead us to lose our place among the world’s free and civilized peoples?*.”

In these cases, the extracts can be read as saying that humanity is not something that separates Bulgaria from other nations, but rather something that binds her to them. In other words, humanity is a criterion which qualifies Bulgaria to belong to the world of nations. It is a norm of nationhood in general rather than a norm of Bulgaria as a specific nation. In such usage, opposition to the law can be seen to rest on norms that are universalistic rather than particularistic both in terms of who should be helped and who should do the helping. But at the same time, even given such a reading, this is still a universalism for which access comes through national identity: the audience are not positioned as civilized individuals but as a civilized *people*. It is as Bulgarians that they belong to civilization and are expected to act accordingly.

In one sense this takes us back to our earlier argument concerning the norms of nationhood, but in another sense it moves us forward. For the expressed motive in these extracts is not only intrinsic (we should adhere to our own norms) but also extrinsic (we are in danger of being punished by others). Passing the law would lead to a loss of status and possible sanctions by others. Hence these extracts introduce a third general type of argument: this is to do with the interests that would be served or that would be threatened by the legislation.

C. Category interests

As with inclusion and norm arguments, interest arguments were generally presented in categorical rather than individual or general terms. The first and simplest argument was in fact a counter-argument. Given that the legislation was labelled a 'Law for the Defence of the Nation', thus implying that Jews had to be constrained because they threatened Bulgarian interests, it was frequently asserted that there was no such threat and hence the law did not benefit the nation. This was done in a number of ways:

sometimes, as we have already seen in extracts 2 and 5, by implying or stating overtly that Jews are too powerless to constitute a threat, sometimes (as in extract 7) by arguing that they are exemplary and dutiful members of Bulgarian society and Bulgarian institutions.

However, as well as contesting the notion that legislation supports the national interest, a number of arguments are used to suggest that it actively endangers Bulgarian interests. As ever, there are times when it is simply asserted that the law will, in the words of the Bulgarian Writers Union (Document 1): *"be very harmful to our people"*. Others spell out some of these dangers. These include the danger of destabilizing the country at a time when unity is crucial (see extract 11); the danger of weakening the Bulgarian economy; and the danger of exposing Bulgarian minorities living in Thrace and Macedonia to greater oppression:

Extract 16 (D2): *"Our concern, our struggles to defend these oppressed minorities will lose much of their judicial and moral foundations if we impose restrictions and arbitrary measures on a national minority here at home"*

This last example in particular underlines the categorical basis of such interest arguments. The audience for this appeal were Bulgarians living in the country while the subjects of the appeal were Bulgarians living outside the country. If anything, defiance of the law made German intervention more likely (see Genov & Baeva, 2003), hence, on an individual level, it threatened audience interests. However, it is as nationals that the protection of unknown fellow Bulgarians furthers their collective self interest.

There is another noteworthy aspect of this example. Whereas arguments about division and economic damage suggest that persecution of Jews will directly harm Bulgaria, the fate of national minorities introduces the idea that the harm will be mediated by the reaction of others to such a measure. The most common and straightforward form of this argument is that oppression would damage the international reputation of Bulgaria. It is encapsulated by Dimo Kazasov when he suggests in Document 5 that the law would lead Bulgaria to: *"lose a moral capital*

accumulated over many long years". He then goes on to spell out the concrete consequences of such a loss:

Extract 17 (D5): *"The war that is being waged here at home against the Jews will not pass unnoticed there: it will inevitably put us morally at odds with public opinion in these various countries, even as our national interests dictate that we maintain cultural as well as economic ties with them. Powerful countries, rich in both material and cultural resources as are the Germans and Italians, can permit themselves the luxury of such discord, but small countries like ours must avoid it for their own good. We need all the friends, the compassion and the help we can get".*

Finally, if the law does not defend the national interest, if it is damaging to the national interest in so many ways, then in whose interest is it? The answer was made explicit by Todor Polyakov in extract 12 above: legislation serves (German) outgroup interests and its proponents if not puppets of the outgroup are at least its dupes. At the risk of making a point that will already be obvious, the ingroup/outgroup category in this case, as in every case we have encountered under 'category interest' arguments, is a national category. The law is nearly always judged against whether it is good or bad for Bulgaria and Bulgarians. The only clear exception comes in the statement of the Holy Synod (Document 4). If all Jews are repressed for being Jewish they will have no choice but to return to their religion and hence conversion will become impossible. Thus *"such measures benefit no one, neither the Church nor our people, whose interests would be better served if they and men of other origins were united"*. But far from invoking a broader category – such as humanity – the argument is in fact invokes a narrower category beside the nation: the Bulgarian Orthodox religious establishment.

Part 2. Summary of Arguments and their Use in the Documents

Having analysed the arguments used in the documents, we are now in a position to summarise our analysis by showing which arguments are used in which document. This is presented in Tables 1 and 2 below.

In Table 1 we summarise the arguments by providing a general description of each one. The arguments are divided into the three types identified in Part 1 of the analysis: category inclusion arguments, category norm arguments and category interest arguments. These in turn will be subdivided in order to consider what type of categories the argument is based upon: national categories, other categories (professional, political, class etc.) and universalistic categories (all human beings).

In Table 2 we indicate which of these arguments is to be found in each of the seven documents. In some cases there are ambiguities and these will be explained in the notes. These ambiguities generally relate to points discussed at more length in Part 1 of the analysis.

 INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE

Discussion

Three clear conclusions can be drawn from our summary of the use of arguments as illustrated in Table 2. The first is that there is a rich diversity of category arguments contained in the appeals for Jewish rescue. These do not just relate to category inclusion and category norms but include a third type of argument not addressed previously: category interests. The second is that category arguments are extremely widespread. All but one of the documents employs all three types of category argument (category inclusion, category norm and category interest) and all of the documents use some form of category argumentation. The third is that the predominant (but not exclusive) form of this argumentation is based on national categories: Jews are Bulgarians; as Bulgarians we show solidarity to others; Bulgarian interests are threatened by anti-semitic measures.

What are the implications of these findings for our understanding of the bases for which Jewish rescue was argued (and which, more widely, may serve to promote social solidarity)? In order to address this question, there are a number of inter-linked issues surrounding our analysis which need to be considered. To what extent do our findings relate to the specific context we are dealing with – that is opposition to the proposed ‘Law for the Defence of the Nation’? Why do we find such a preponderance of arguments based on national categories? What explains the difference between our findings and previous analyses which stress the universalistic bases of rescue (Geras, 1995; Monroe, 1996, 2003)?

If we take seriously Billig’s (1987) observation that all positions are a statement in an argument, then inevitably, the documents we have analysed are shaped by what they are arguing against – that is, legislation based on the premise that Jews as a category are a threat to Bulgaria as a category. Such a proposition invites (and receives) the retort “oh no they are not, and if anything it is the legislation that threatens Bulgaria”. That is, the specific context can easily be used to explain both the existence of category arguments and the overwhelming preponderance of nationhood as the basis for such arguments.

However, the first thing to say is that, if our findings relate to context, this is a context that, in its general features, is extremely common not only in the Nazi holocaust, but also in other cases of genocide. Nazi anti-semitism was premised upon characterising the Jews as “community aliens” who endangered the German nation (Koonz, 2003; Peukert, 1987). Similarly, the Rwandan genocide was premised upon the notion that Tutsis were outsiders who dominated and polluted the country (Des Forges, 1999). Solidarities always exist in response to exclusions and, since exclusions are so often based upon nationhood, then our findings may well have wider applicability than the specific case under consideration.

This argument is supported by considering some of the texts relating to later waves of repression in Bulgaria. Thus, in response to the evacuation and internment of Sofia’s Jews in May 1943, a letter to King Boris from a number of public figures asserts that: *“In subjecting our innocent fellow citizens to this cruel and pitiless measure, not only are we squandering a vast moral capital of which our generous and tolerant people*

had every right to be proud, we are also harming Bulgaria's reputation in the eyes of the world and compromising its future national interests". In this single sentence we can see all three types of argument – category inclusion (“*our innocent fellow citizens*”), category norms (“*our generous and tolerant people*”) and category interest (“*harming Bulgaria's reputation*”). What is more, all three are unambiguously national. Thus the use of such arguments is not dependent upon a law that invokes nationhood in its very title but rather relates to the more general logic of exclusion. So, while the particular focus on national interest arguments in our documents and the particular form these national interest arguments take may relate to the specific context, we would argue that the more general use of national category arguments is of wider significance.

Of course, this only raises a further question – why is the play of exclusion and inclusion centred around nationhood? For us, the use of categories relates both to who one is trying to mobilise and also to the mobilisation goal. In terms of the former, national categories appeal to an entire territorial population rather than small sections of it – as would, say, categories of class, religion or even gender (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a). Thus using nationhood as a basis of exclusion has the advantage of allowing advocates to appear as champions of the great majority and to mobilise the majority to achieve their ends. More specifically, using nationhood as a ground for advocating solidarity has the advantage of mobilising the great majority of the population against exclusion. If Jews are Bulgarians, then the entire population should feel attacked by an attack on Jews. If Bulgarians are humanitarian, then everybody is impelled to support Jewish victims.

In terms of the latter, the content of mobilisation, it is arguable that the specific histories of particular nations and the general ideology of nationhood also lend an advantage to the use of national categories in mobilising against persecution. Where a country has been formed through a struggle for independence against a powerful and dominant other, then notions of ‘freedom’, of ‘justice’ and the need to fight oppression will be highly available and highly charged. We are not suggesting that such nations will necessarily eschew persecution or that nationhood cannot be used to argue for persecution (it obviously can), but rather that when people want to challenge persecution, the writing of national history will provide them rhetorical resources with

which to do so. In this sense, history is not a determinant of the present, but provides a ‘symbolic reserve’ (Reszler, 1992) which can be drawn upon in building for the future (see also Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a; Reicher, Hopkins & Condor, 1997b). Thus we see extensive invocation of the Bulgarian independence struggle, and of its key figures, within the documents we have been analysing.

In addition to Bulgaria’s specific history, the ideology of nationhood likewise provides powerful rhetorical resources: if Jews can be included as nationals then any attempt to make them ‘second class citizens’ violates the idea of a ‘horizontal community’. If a law can be characterised as arising out of external pressure, then it can be rejected as violating the principle of ‘sovereignty’. If a measure can be presented as ‘uncivilized’ then it threatens the right of one’s country to belong to the family of nations. There is an important point here. The predominance of national categories should not be seen as counterposed to universalism. Rather, in a world of nation states, it is through characterising what it means to be a nation that one arrives at norms that aspire to encompass all of humanity.

But while there may be a series of advantages to the use of national categories in advocating particular types of mobilisation, the thrust of our argument – and our claim to generality - is not to do with the prevalence of any particular category, but rather in the relationship between the type of category arguments that are used and the form of mobilisation that is advocated. That is, effective arguments will be those which use categories best able (a) to include all those one is seeking to mobilise and (b) to provide the resources with which to render normative the actions one is advocating. Depending on the forms of action one seeks to organize, sometimes sub-national categories will suffice. For instance, if one were appealing for help from a particular section of the population – say the Trades Unions – one might argue that most Jews, like themselves, are poor workers and an attack on them is an attack on the working classes. Equally, there are times when more extended categories will be preferred since, at the human level, all victims are necessarily included in a common ingroup.

Hence we do find examples of category arguments in our documents which are based on these more restricted or more extended categories. In other contexts, involving different audiences and different victims, it may well be that they would predominate

over the national level of categorisation. To reiterate the central point, the specific categories that are used to advocate help will always depend upon context; the importance of construing relations of inclusion between helpers and victims, of construing helping as normative for the audience ingroup and victim suffering as a threat to ingroup interests – whatever categories are used to achieve them – obtains irrespective of context.

But still one must explain why, in addressing what is apparently the same phenomenon of rescue, our findings concerning which categories are used to advocate intervention are so at odds with existing research on the bases for acts of intervention: why do we find a preponderance of national rather than universal positions? One part of the answer has to do with whether we are, in fact, looking at the same phenomenon. As we argued in the introduction, we are dealing with the phenomenon of collective mobilisation rather than individual acts of rescue. Our concern is with how the mass of ordinary people can be induced to take a relatively small and safe step (but, collectively, one of massive significance) rather than with why relatively few exceptional people made major and highly dangerous leaps.

We have described the literature which suggests that individual rescuers tended to have a worldview based on universalist categories which included any victim as a fellow human being and that this worldview was often a product of a long socialisation. However, by this very token, it follows that most people will not have such a world view and will not view people in such terms. In the language of social identity (or rather, to be more accurate, self-categorisation theory), universalist categories will simply not be available to them (Oakes, Turner & Haslam, 1994). This being the case, an attempt to mobilise people in universalist terms is unlikely to be successful. It is far more powerful to use such potentially inclusive categories as will be available to all those in the target population, in terms of which they will have been socialised and which they use regularly.

Clearly, nationhood meets these criteria. In a world of nation states, national categories suffuse our everyday understanding, from the school books we read to the way the weather is described (Billig, 1995; Citron, 1989). Thus both mobilisers and the mobilised are far more likely to use these categories, to be familiar with national

references and to accept arguments based on nationhood. In short, mobilisation is dependent upon the use of categories which are banal even if the ways they are construed (i.e. who is included within them, the norms and interests ascribed to them) is highly creative. The use of exceptional categories which shape the acts of exceptional people are therefore less likely to be effective. For these reasons, we would suggest that the differences between our findings and previous findings are indeed because we are looking at somewhat different phenomena even if they may both be included under the rubric of 'rescue'. The reason why we find few arguments based on universalistic categories (and that, when we do, they are often arrived at through conceiving the world as a system of nations) is not because people cannot relate to them or because, being more extended, they are necessarily weaker (cf. Rorty, 1989) but simply because fewer people are socialised into them in our divided world.

Let us conclude by considering the more general implications of our study for understanding and promoting solidarity with the oppressed. The first thing is to acknowledge that this study alone can, at best, establish only a *prima facie* case for the role of category construction in creating such solidarities. What we know from the historical evidence is that there was a significant mass mobilisation against the deportation of Jews from 'old' Bulgaria and that this mobilisation played an important part in pressuring politicians and ultimately the king to halt the deportation. While, in the short term, the movement against the 'Law for the Protection of the Nation' may have failed to stop the legislation being passed, commentators from very different standpoints (Cohen & Assa, 1977; Todorov, 2001) acknowledge that it was crucial in laying down the conditions of future success.

What we have shown in the present analysis is that arguments concerning category inclusion, category norms and category interests were present, indeed prominent, in the documents that appealed for opposition to the bill. Putting the two together, we can demonstrate the co-occurrence of certain category arguments and anti-discrimination mobilisations (and it is also worth recalling that in the case of the Jews of Macedonia and Thrace where these category arguments were absent and, notably, the Jews were not seen as Bulgarian, there was no such mobilisation and over 11,000 people were deported to the death camps). What we cannot demonstrate, however, is

whether these arguments were effective in inducing people to act (see Thompson, 1990). For that, one would have to address how and why people responded to the appeals, but there is no systematic contemporaneous data on this matter and post-hoc accounts in these matters are notoriously problematic (Geras, 1995; Monroe, 2003). Our present analysis is therefore necessary, but not sufficient to demonstrating that rescue hinged on the ways in which bystanders were led to understand their own social identity.

A broader case concerning the actual importance of category arguments for rescue therefore depends upon combining the findings of this study with other findings derived from different methods. We have previously conducted experimental studies which manipulate category definitions and demonstrate that these affect helping behaviour (Levine et al., 2002, 2005). These principally relate to category inclusion such that the more widely the boundaries of the ingroup are drawn, the more people are helped. Yet to show that that category constructions *can* affect helping does not demonstrate that, in situations where helping becomes a life or death matter, they *are* used in order to promote intervention. That is what we show in this study. Moreover, our analysis demonstrates the richness of category argumentation which relates not only to inclusion, but to group norms and category interests as well. The impact of such arguments merit further experimental investigation. There is a broader methodological point here: in studying a major phenomenon such as helping we do not see there to be a one way movement from the laboratory to the field, but a constant to-ing and fro-ing where each domain of study enriches the other (cf. Blumer, 1969).

If this study has suggested a new facet to the social identity model of helping, it also suggests a number of new facets to our understanding of solidarity and rescue. Most significantly, perhaps, we need to complement the study of individual rescuers with a study of collective rescue and how it is mobilised. A social identity account is of particular use in this enterprise, not only at a theoretical level but also at a practical level. If we only consider helping in terms of long term socialisation then there is nothing we can do in the short term when solidarity is urgently needed and when populations need to be mobilised. However, we can always create new ways of

defining familiar categories in order to render solidarity a matter of supporting 'our' community, expressing 'our' identity or else defending 'our' interests.

We have previously shown that the architects of genocide have been all too skilful as 'entrepreneurs of identity' who define categories and category relations such that the ingroup is imperilled by an outgroup whose destruction then becomes an imperative of (collective) self-defence (Reicher, 1996b, Reicher & Hopkins, 2004, see also Koonz, 2003). Architects of rescue need to become equally adept entrepreneurs who construct more inclusive and more humane communities whose interests are served by acts of rescue. A social identity account, we hope, will help provide them with the tools for the job.

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